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Abstract 
This paper first describes the latest progress in national and international standardization 
efforts concerning the use of microprocessor based safety-related systems. 
General design considerations applying to the German standards (TU V Handbook, 
DIN 801) are then presented in the second part, where a commonly used failure model 
and certain process-related time constraints will be discussed. 
The third part of this paper deals with two possible examples of commonly used 
system structures and describes basic technical solutions to provide the necessary safety 
features. 
KeywoTC!S: safety-related systems, safety standards. 
Standards Concerning Safety-related Applications 
In the common European market primarily European Standards will be 
used and therefore it is a goal of national standardisation efforts to work on 
European standards. The national standards should only be used in areas 
where no international or European standards. The national standards 
should only be used in areas where no international or European standards 
are available. 
The standards described in the following chapters are original Ger-
man standards used in the fields of safety related applications. It is in-
tended to faise the standard DIN VDE 0116 to a European level. The 
DIN V VDE 19250 influences the work of some OEN standardisation groups 
as a working document. DIN V VDE 801 is seen in some correletion to the 
IEO working groups 9 and 10 and at the moment it is not predictable if 
this standard will lead to a European Standard. 
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DIN VDE 0116: Electrical equipment of furnaces 
DIN VDE 0116 concerns the electrical equipment used in furnaces and is 
one of the first German standards to use failure models with the help of 
data flow diagrams. The following cases are distinguished: 
Failure consideration on the permanently wired part of the safety 
equipment 
Evidenced safety against failures and faults for the stored pro-
gram part of the safety equipment 
Evidenced safety of software 
Beside the details of furnace techniques, the explanatory part of this stan-
dard provides several basic statements on: 
specification 
checking the specification 
program diversity 
program analysis and software tools 
What is special about this standard is its historical aspect, as it is one 
of the first specific standards to deal with the basic problems of software 
development. 
TUV Handbook: Microcomputers in Safety Technique 
The handbook 'Microcomputers in Safety Technique' (HOLSCHER and 
RADER, 1986), is a guide for developers and manufacturers who are de-
signing and developing safety-related systems. It contains a catalogue of 
system structures and safety measures for microcomputer control systems, 
distinguishing various safety classes and providing different sets of measures 
those classes. 
Five safety classes are defined here. Beginning with the existing 
equipment-specific individual standards, these classes are assigned to appli-
cations. The following list shows the original assignments of safety-related 
equipment to the classes: 
Class 1: Press control systems to ZIIl /456 or 457 
Train signalling systems to DIN 57831 / VDE 0831 
Tracking systems 
Class 2: Elevator control systems to TRA 200/101 
Escalator control systems (unless covered by EN 115) 
Class 3: Road traffic signalling equipment to DIN 57831 / VDE 
0832 
Electrical furnace equipment to DIN 57116 / VDE 0116 
Class 4: 
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Remote control systems for gas and oil pipelines to TRGL 
181 
Mo bile sales units (current equipment) 
Aerial cableway control systems 
Electrical medical equipment to DIN IEC 601 / VDE 0750 
Radio remote control systems for cranes to ZHl/547 
Platform lifts to VBG 14 
Class 5: Household appliances 
Ski fixtures and adjustment equipment 
Paper shredders 
Control systems for power-driven gates 
Sets of technical measures are assigned to each of these safety classes, while 
distinguishing between two alternative implementations: 
- single-channel structure with monitoring 
- twin-channel structure 
The individual measures are then described, along with their efficiency in 
dealing with the various fault causes and the testing necessary to demon-
strate safety. 
DIN V VDE 19 250: Measurement and control: Fundamental safety 
aspects to be considered for measurement and control equipment 
This standard provides a systematic way of setting up technical safety re-
quirements. Some important terminology is defined and the significance of 
process control protection and protection equipment is explained. The risk 
of equipment without protection is reduced by process control protective 
measures,often in combination with non-process control protection, to a 
residual risk, which should be smaller than the acceptable risk limit. The 
acceptable risk limit is defined by the acceptance of the threats by the 
society and by the needs for protection. 
The risk of the overall system being reduced is divided into partial 
risks of the subsystems. Requirements graded into eight requirement classes 
are determined for each partial risk, which is described by its risk param-
eters. 
These eight requirement classes represent an extension of the previous 
five-class scheme from the TUV Handbook and, in addition , they are 
independent of applications, i.e. not assigned per definition to fixed areas, 
for example an elevator control system. 
The risk element of a technical system is assigned to one of the eight 
requirement classes using a risk chart which applies the parameters: extent 
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Fig. 1. Risk chart and requirement classes 
of damage, abode time, hazard prevention and occurrence probability to 
determine the assignment. 
The risk parameters have the following meanings: 
S Extent of damage 
SI: slight injury 
S2: severe irreversible injury to one or more persons or death 
of one person 
S3: Death of several persons 
S4: catastrophic consequences, several deaths 
A Abode time 
AI: seldom to relatively frequent 
A2: frequent to continuous 
G Hazard prevention 
Gl: possible under certain conditions 
G2: hardly possible 
W . Occurrence probability of the undesired event 
Wl: very low 
W2: low 
W3: relatively high 
The essential new basic idea here is that these parameters can be used 
to assign the various applications (from the nuclear power station to the 
household iron) to one of the eight classes independently of the application 
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and the technology used, making the different application areas comparable 
in terms of their safety-related classification. 
DIN V VDE 0801: Principles for computers in safety-related systems 
This standard is an extension to the TUV Handbook by HOLscHER and 
RADER. It also deals with measures for avoiding and controlling faults, 
whereby the measures for avoiding faults take into account the different 
phases of the product life cycle. The individual measures are then ex-
plained in detail and illustrated by examples in a very exhaustive normative 
appendix. The discussion includes hardware and software development as 
well as structural considerations on redundant and diversified systems. 
The subject is rounded off by a number of examples of measures in 
different requirement classes. 
5SC65A WG 10: Draft: Functional safety 
of programmable electronic systems: Generic aspects 
This draft is concerned on an international level with the functional safety 
of programmable electronic systems. It is currently under thorough revision 
but finally aims at forming a 'basis for future application-specific in terna-
tional standards for all areas of application.' Revisions are also intended to 
make the standard independent of the technology of the protection system. 
Ideas on system structure and on the classification of systems form 
one of the essential aspects of this paper. In the chapter entitled 'Phase 
plan of the safety system,' fundamental knowledge is imparted on: 
Hazard analysis and risk assessment 
Specification of safety requirements 
Description of safety-related systems 
Design and execution 
Validation of safety 
Operation and maintenance 
Modification of the system (in preparation) 
Shutting down (in preparation) 
Retrofitting (in preparation) 
The elaboration of the subjects covers the entire service life of the pro-
grammable electronic system. 
The further key points of this paper are ideas on the quality require-
ments and ways of assessing the system. 
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SC65A WG 9: Draft: Software for computers in the application 
of industrial safety-related systems 
This paper (IEC 1989b) deals specifically with issues of software safety. 
Beside general considerations on software architecture, design strategies 
(top-down design etc.), the entire software life-cycle is examined. The 
following topics are discussed: 









The appendix introduces and discusses methods of design, design verifica-
tion, documentation and development rules. 
System Design Considerations 
This chapter collects some ideas on the designing of safety-relevant systems. 
The basic idea is to distinguish between all functional parts of the process 
and all safety related parts. The safety related parts should handle all 
safety features, e.g. failure detection, shut down operation, self tests ect. 
Most of all safety related applications are time critical and therefore a 
failure model commonly employed in safety engineering techniques will be 
explained and basic timing considerations presented. 
Failure Model 
Safety engineering usually assumes the following basic premise: 
A simple first error must not lead to a critical system state. This means 
that when a fault of this type occurs, the protection system must immediately 
bring the process into a safe state, at least within a maximum fault detection 
and fault response time specified by the process. 
It is not assumed that two independent faults occur exactly at the 
same time, but consecutive faults are regarded as a single fault. 
In the event of an undetected and inherently non-critical first fault 
the additional occurrence of a second fault must be expected after a period 
of time specified. 
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The fault detection and fault response times of the protection system 
should always be clearly shorter than the second fault occurrence time. 
Values of 1/10 of the second fault occurrence time or better would be 
recommend able here. 
Timing Considerations 
In the following section different configurations of single-channel and twin-
channel systems will be examined with regard to their timing, based on the 
failure model above. We distinguish between the actual process guidance 
(operational process control system) and a process control protection sys-
tem in conjunction with various process-conditioned timing requirements. 
Fault occurs 
in process or 
control system 
Fault begins to 
take effect in process 
or control system 
Process goes 
over into critical 
state 
______ ~v~ _____________________ v7_---------------------v~~--~ 
~ Process fault latency intervaiprocess fault tolerance timej 
Fig. 2. Timing considerations for control system and process 
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Fault response time 
Fig. 3. Timing considerations for the protection system of the process 
a) Process control system containing control and protection functions 
In a combined control and protection system -- without additional 
measures -- no fault must occur which will lead to a critical process 
state and at the same time prevent the protection system from taking 
effect. 
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This leads to the need for a functional separation of the closed-loop 
control system and the protection system. 
b} The control and protection system are functionally separate, the pro-
tection system is simple 
bi} Fault in control system, protection system intact 
The requirement for the protection system here is that the fault 
detection and response times required to detect and respond 
to the faulty process state always be smaller than the process-
conditioned fault tolerance time. 
b2} Faults in the protection system, control system intact 
Here, the fault detection and response times required to detect 
and respond to the protection system fault should always be 
clearly smailer than the second fault occurrence time. 
The second fault occurrence time is a period of time independent 
of the reliability of the overall system (process, operational and 
protective systems) following which, on average, the occurrence 
of a further independent fault can be expected. This second fault 
may by, for wxample, a fault in the closed-loop control system, 
necessitating the availability of a functioning protection system. 
Depending on the type of process control safety requirement, 
this can mean that different measures are taken when a fault is 
detected in the protection system, e.g: 
safe process state reached, emergency shut down sys-
tems 
pure message, alarm systems 
reconfiguration with standby systems etc. 
The fault can also be detected in different ways, e.g. by 
- technical measures, self-testing etc. 
- organisational measures, repeated tests etc. 
The selection of measures, however, is always dependent on the 
process-conditioned timing requirements and on the feasibility 
of the organisational measures. 
c} Closed-loop control system, parallel protection system, multiple pro-
tection systems to increase safety 
cl} Fault in closed-loop control system, protection system intact 
The same requirement applies here as in case bI) 
c2} Fault in a protection system, closed-loop control system intact 
As the protection system here is a twin version, there will still 
be a functioning protection system available at this moment. 
Lower requirements can be specified here with regard to the fault 
detection and response times required to detect and respond to 
the faulty protection system. 
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Examples of Technical Solutions 
Single-channel Solution 
We speak of a single-channel structure when there is one single processing 
unit (e.g. a microprocessor) responsible both for operational functions and 






Independent shutdown path 
Fig. 4. Single channel system with monitoring 
As explained in the previous chapter, processor failure here could lead to 
dangerous system states, as the protection function is also provided by the 
processor. This makes single-channel solutions suitable only for low safety 
requirements, and only when a system state can be clearly defined and 
additional monitoring functions are incorporated. This means: 
implementation of timing monitoring (watch-dog) 
implementation of a second independent time base 
two shutdown paths independent of each other 
implementation of extensive self-testing 
The processor and the monitoring system must test each other and each 
must be capable of bringing the process into a safe state independently of 
each other in the event of a fault. This shutdown option must be tested at 
certain intervals to ensure that when an undetected and non-critical first 
fault occurrs, which would prevent protective action from being taken, the 
first fault is detected by the self-test, an alarm message is generated and 
the process can be taken into safe state (shut down). 
The cyclic self-tests contain: 
- microprocessor self-test (instruction set, registers etc.) 
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RAM test 
EPROM (memory) test 
test of peripheral components (timers, DMA etc.) 
test of If 0 paths 
watchdog test 
shut-down path test 
Further methods of providing robust program and software configuration 
are: 
logical and temporal program execution monitoring 
assertions 
area checks (index range etc.) 
functional diversity by means of control and protective software 
separation 
Twin-channel Solution 
In the twin-channel solution two independent processing units (micropro-
cessors) each perform the same tasks, while the results are continuously 
and cyclically cross-checked (complementary testing). This can mean that 
the output signals from the processors are each put through a fail-safe 
comporator which shuts down the process when a mismatch is found. 
Micro- Micro-
processor processor 








Fig. 5. Twin channel system 
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Self-tests should be incorporated here too, but they need not be performed 
to the full extent. All dynamically changing signals fed through the com-
parator are supervised. Static signals however need to be tested, because 
passive br eakdown (no signal change) will not be detected by the com-
parator. In this case the same failure could occur in the second channel 
after a certain time and the protective system would not be able to operate 
correctly. 
Conclusion 
In the first chapter we introduced various national and international stan-
dards and guide-lines reflecting the current state of standardization activity 
in the field of safety-related systems and equipment. 
This was followed by some basic system and timing considerations for 
a failure model commonly used in safety engineering. 
Finally, examples of single-channel and twin-channel solutions completed 
our brief safety discussion. 
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